I've been thinking Barack Obama would like very much to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, or (if that fails) at least have him declared officially dead. If he is successful in actually nailing bin Laden, it would be a game changer in more ways than one. This would not only appear to fulfill a campaign promise he made and endear him with the American people, but it would go a long way towards his goal of ending the war on terror -- or at least enable him to declare it as largely over.

But where is Osama bin Laden? There already appears to be a growing consensus (if that's the right word) that he no longer exists.

In a recent interview in which he offered reassurances about the security of Pakistan's nukes, President Zardawi opined that bin Laden is dead, and asserted that US officials feel the same way:

In a wide-ranging interview with the international media, Zardari spoke about the mystery surrounding the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden, growing Taleban clout in Pakistan and his own political future.

"I want to assure the world that the nuclear capability of Pakistan is under safe hands," he said.

Zardari said Pakistan had a strong command-and-control system for its nuclear weapons that was fully in place.

Zardari said the whereabouts of Osama Bin Laden remained a mystery and there was a suspicion that he could be dead.

He said US officials had told him that they had no trace of the Al-Qaeda chief and the same view was shared by his own intelligence agencies.

"There is no news," the president said. "They obviously feel that he does not exist anymore but that's not confirmed, we can't confirm that," he said, referring to Pakistani intelligence agencies.

Zardari said authorities in the northwest of the country had struck the deal with Islamists in Swat in line with the popular demand for a negotiated and political settlement of the issue.

If that is US policy and it is changed, who gets to claim credit for his death?

There's been much discussion of having talks with so-called Taliban "moderates," with few specifics about who these people might be. I'm inclined to agree with analysts who say that there is no such thing as a Taliban moderate. (See this post by Michelle Malkin, which has additional links.)

However, the Saudis (who appear to endorse the idea that bin Laden is dead) have been pushing the "moderate Taliban" meme, and this Saudi analysis actually names names of purportedly moderate Taliban leaders.

I'm skeptical, because if the leadership of the Taliban is not moderate, even if there were a few "moderates" to be found, precisely how would they be installed at the top?

Naturally I find myself wondering whether the courting of the elusive moderate Taliban wing is grounded in wishful thinking, or whether it might indicate some sort of strategy.

As things stand, the Taliban forces which gained control of the Swat area hardly seem "moderate." According to this account, they have invited Osama bin Laden in:

Even though the agreement ignores the constitution by setting up a new legal system in the valley, which is not genuine Islamic law but the Taleban's brutal interpretation of it, Mr Gilani reiterated on 18 April that ''whatever we have done is in accordance with the constitution and there is no need to worry".

In fact the majority of Pakistanis are desperately worried, asking how the state could concede so quickly.

The Swat Taleban added fuel to the fire by inviting Osama Bin Laden to settle in Swat, indicating their complete control of the valley.

On 20 April, Sufi Muhammad, a radical leader who the government and the army have termed as ''a moderate" and whose son in law Fazlullah is the leader of the Swat Taleban, said that democracy, the legal system of the country and civil society should be disbanded as they were all ''systems of infidels".

The Taleban have now infiltrated western and southern Punjab province with the help of Punjabi extremist groups, the second largest city of Lahore and the southern port city of Karachi.

Even more surprising has been the attitude of the army, which has declined all international and local pressure to curb the spread of the Taleban.

If the goal is to drive a wedge between the Taliban and al Qaeda by courting "moderates," that does not appear to be happening so far.

From a military standpoint, it appears that the longstanding alliance between the two takes advantage of a historic enemy strategy:

With al-Qaeda safely ensconced within Pakistan, the United States is in the position of trying to destroy an enemy occupying a position in territory that belongs to a supposed ally. The only way our military has to strike back at Taliban positions without actually entering the country is to use unmanned drone aircraft, a practice that has come under much criticism from Pakistanis, because of the inevitable collateral damage.

In another New York Times article published on May 5, "Porous Pakistani Border Could Hinder U.S.," the writer observed: "If Taliban strategists have their way, [U.S.] forces [in Afghanistan] will face a stiff challenge, not least because of one distinct Taliban advantage: the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan barely exists for the Taliban, who are counting on the fact that American forces cannot reach them in their sanctuaries in Pakistan."

The problem of fighting enemies hiding across international borders in sanctuary areas was a major handicap for U.S. forces in both Korea and Vietnam. The insanity and treachery behind the catastrophic policy of giving the Chinese communist troops a privileged sanctuary on the north side of the Yalu River -- from which they could launch massive attacks against American soldiers in Korea without fear of retaliation -- is legendary.

A similar situation existed in Vietnam, where a strategic offensive against Hanoi would have been a sure approach to victory. But President Johnson -- like President Truman before him during Korea -- blocked such a path. North Vietnam also became a sanctuary. According to historian Dave Palmer, such fear "protected North Vietnam from invasion more surely than any instrument of war Hanoi could have fielded.

But maybe the Saudis and President Obama know something I don't.

I'd really like to know whether Osama bin Laden is in fact dead.

If he is, it might be politically very convenient for Pakistan. Here's Tom Maguire:

Pakistan's ISI announces their conclusion that Osama bin Laden is dead. Although I don't speak Austrian, I believe a more complete translation of their announcement is "Osama is dead already, so go away and leave us alone".

Osama could be dead. He could be alive. The problem with trusting the ISI's conclusion is that they have a huge stake in convincing people of the former. They'd like nothing better than to declare Osama dead and get some of the international heat off of Pakistan -- and the ISI itself, which has been thoroughly infiltrated by Islamic extremists sympathetic to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

As Bill also points out, that heat has risen considerably over the last few months. Obama has raised the profile of the Af-Pak War, by increasing American troop levels in the theater and by failing to get more combat troops from our NATO partners. Pakistani intel would like nothing better than to give Europe enough excuse to push for an end to the Afghanistan mission. If Osama's dead, they might think, it would be easier for the West to declare victory and go home.

[Osama] never taunts the US anymore. All high level communications from Al Qaeda are now issued by al-Zawahiri. We can stop the charade of calling him Al Qaeda's No. 2, he has now inherited the No. 1 spot.

For Obama, taking out Zawahiri would be almost as much of a coup as taking out bin Laden, but the attack drone approach seems to have backfired:

Col Kilcullen, who has also informally advised the Obama administration and British government, said yesterday: "The Pakistani population sees the drones as neo-colonial, and they are especially unpopular in the Punjab, where there is a rising militancy."

Steve Coll, president of the New America Foundation, said the administration was "acknowledging that there is an interaction between the attacks and political instability and are re-evaluating the costs and benefits of these attacks".

He said the Obama administration decided to intensify the attacks in the hope they would reach the top of al-Qaeda quickly.

He added: "My sense is they were looking at their watches trying to finish the job but they have run out of time."

A temporary cessation in air assaults would offer a considerable reprieve to their main targets such as al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al Zawahiri and Beitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban held responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the former president, last year.

The One's not going to deny himself the glory of scalping Bin Laden or Zawahiri if he has a chance, but the mid-level operational guys may suddenly have a reprieve. There's an interesting contrast with the torture calculus here: Opponents of harsh interrogation refuse to balance the morality of inflicting suffering on one to possibly avoid the suffering of many, but in the case of drone strikes, the suffering of many seems to be the cold, hard, bottom line. If blasting terrorists and civilians in their vicinity from 20,000 feet makes America safer, let's do it; if not blasting terrorists and civilians from 20,000 feet makes America safer by taking some heat off a wobbly, nuclear-armed government, then let's do that. A strange game.

Incidentally, David Obey's given Obama a loose deadline of one year to turn Afghanistan around before they start cutting funds for the war. I'll be surprised if the anti-war movement waits even that long. Is that why The One didn't respond to Iranian aircraft attacking Iraqi villages, incidentally -- because he can't be "distracted" from the real war right now? Or was that more a case of politely looking the other way in the interests of "dialogue"?

Maybe if the "moderates" can be persuaded to agree that bin Laden is dead, then everyone will be able to let bygones be bygones, sing "Kumbaya," and go home.

But will they promise not to steal the nukes? I'm skeptical.

MORE: Ryan Mauro argues that al Qaeda is the least of our worries, and that the strategy of making deals with "moderates" is of great benefit to jihadists:

The tendency of the West to look for any sign of rationality, open-mindedness, or humanity in radicals results in a remarkably low standard for which one can be designated a "moderate."

The effect of such psychology, which often emanates from an outlook influenced by moral relativism, will be to embrace extremists at the expense of true moderates, resulting in a longer, and far more costly, war against radical Islam. The price to pay to become labeled a moderate by the West -- namely, to be marginally less reckless and extreme in tactics than al-Qaeda -- is quite the bargain, as such a strategy is more beneficial to their jihad in the long run anyway.