the formalist doctrine of precedent would facilitate the transition to the original meaning of the constitutional text in the way that it assigned gravitational force to precedents. The respect a precedent deserves would depend in part on the reasoning employed. Decisions based on a good faith attempt to read the text in light of its original meaning would be entitled to greater respect than decisions which pulled constitutional doctrines out of thin air. This rule would create a ratchet effect. Formalists precedents would have generative force; ultrarealist precedents would have little influence outside the specific constitutional issue and factual context. As more formalist precedents accumulated, the movement to constitutional formalism would begin to accelerate. As a practical consequence, this means that the transition to original meaning would proceed very slowly at first and then it would gradually begin to pick up speed. This process would allow social expectations to adjust and institutional arrangements to adapt. It would even allow time for constitutional amendments, if the pattern of change and reaction revealed that such amendments were necessary.

In other words, if the Supreme Court were to adhere to a formalist doctrine of precedent, the result would be a slow but sure transition to constitutional formalism.
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2004_01_01_lsolum_archive.html#107351756559826553

everyone (citizens and officials alike) should begins to act on the basis of the formalist constitution. That is, we should all give our constitutional allegiance to the real constitution--the one that sits under glass in Washington, D.C. And we should withhold our allegiance from the judicially mangled constitution--the one found between the covers of the United States Reports. Suppose that we did. The result would be a constitutional big bang, a rapid transition from the realist constitution created by judicial fiat to the constitutional order embodied in the text, structure, and history of the Constitution of the United States of America.

But a moment's reflection suggests that this constitutional big bang would be problematic, to say the very least. For now, let's put aside the practical problems. Let's ignore the fact that it might be difficult to instantaneously transition to a world where the FCC, the CPSC, the EPA, the SEC, and the NLRB were all unconstitutional. Let's set aside the problem of transferring authority from Washington to Albany, Sacramento, and Austin. Even without those problems, we would face another problem of monumental proportions.

What problem is that? A big bang that involved everyone (judges, other officials, and citizens) would lead to an intractable problem of authority and social coordination. Even if every single judge, every single official, and every single citizen were to become a committed originalist overnight, this would not lead to agreement about the meaning of the constitution. Why not? There are three problems that constitutional formalism must face:

1. The Problem of Textual Ambiguity--Some provisions of the constitution are highly determinate in meaning. For example, there is little disagreement about what the requirement that the President be 35 years of age means. Other provisions are general and abstract, creating vagueness and ambiguity. Examples include the due process, privileges and immunities, and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. But it is not just the text of the constitution itself that is vagie and ambiguous; the historical record (the guide to original meaning) is ambiguous as well. Documents such as The Federalist Papers, the record of the constitutional convention, and the ratification debates themselves contain abstract and general language that creates further vagueness and ambiguity. My point is not that the relevant texts provide no guidance; clearly many interpretations are wholly inconsistent with the text and original meaning. Nor am I a relativist about original meaning. I believe that some interpretations are better than others, and that usually there is a best interpretation that can be supported by good and sufficient evidence. Rather it is that these texts will frequently admit of more than one interpretation. Given the variability of human beings, it is inevitable that there will be disagreements even among formalists about what the Constitution means.

2. The Problem of Incomplete Historical Knowledge--Different interpreters of the constitution know different things about constitutional history, and even when all that knowledge is added together, it is partial and incomplete. It is not uncommon for constitutional scholars to discover new historical evidence, or discovery a significant but neglected passage in a well-known source. Because of incomplete historical knowledge, different interpreters will understand the original meaning of the constitution in different ways. Because new historical knowledge comes to light or becomes more widely disseminated, our understanding of original meaning will vary over time.

3. The Problem of Partiality--The first two problems are compounded by a third. Different interpreters are partial to different interests. We are members of different affinity groups and we are committed to a variety of causes and ideologies. Given human nature, it is hardly surprising that our attachments influence our interpretations. Given textual vagueness and ambiguity and the problem of incomplete historical knowledge, it is inevitable that we will tend to favor those interpretations of the Constitution that serve the interests to which we are partial. Such partiality is not necessarily a result of bad faith. It is simply a fact of human nature that we are attracted to the conclusions that we wish were true.

Given these three problems, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that a formalist big bang, with each every citizen, official, and judge acting on the basis of their own interpretation of the text and original meaning would be completely unworkable